STANDARDS × PATENTS ÷ ANTITRUST = ∞:
THE INADEQUACY OF ANTITRUST TO
ADDRESS PATENT AMBUSH
JONATHAN HILLEL1

ABSTRACT
“Patent ambush” describes certain rent-seeking behavior by
the owner of patent rights to a technology that is essential to an
industry standard. Two cases, Qualcomm and Rambus, represent
attempts of the Third and D.C. Circuits, respectively, to address
patent ambushes using federal antitrust statutes. In both cases,
antitrust law proves inadequate to the task. Under Qualcomm,
licensees gain too much power to extort undervalued royalty rates
from patent holders who have disclosed their rights during
standard-setting. Under Rambus, coupled with the dearth of other
options to combat patent ambushes, non-disclosing patent holders
are given free reign over standardized markets, to the detriment of
end-users. This iBrief argues that the flaws in each rule inhere
from a fundamental inadequacy of antitrust law to address patent
ambush.

INTRODUCTION
Industry standards in high-technology markets can enhance
competition by allowing supply to be vertically segmented and/or
horizontally decentralized across multiple firms. When standards work, the
technology’s market will grow, as consumers are offered lower prices and
more choices. But, standards sometimes fail. In a “patent ambush,” a
single supplier who owns patent rights to an essential component in a
standard exploits the market by demanding excessive licensing fees from
firms at other levels of the supply chain. As a result, technology prices may
remain high, and consumers may be deprived of choices. Although antitrust
law purports to prevent harm to consumers by prohibiting anticompetitive
practices, recent case law demonstrates that it is inadequate to address
patent ambush.
¶1

The Qualcomm case from the Third Circuit2 and the Rambus case
from the D.C. Circuit3 are opposed to each other in their treatment of patent
¶2

1

J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 2009 (magna cum laude, Order
of the Coif; Articles Editor, Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property).
2
Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm, Inc., 501 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2007).
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ambushes under antitrust law. Each precedent also establishes perverse
incentives for patent holders and licensees in standardized markets.
Qualcomm raises the specter of oligopsonistic exploitation of patent
holders, thereby creating disincentives to their participation in and full
disclosure in connection with standard-setting activities.4 Rambus, by
contrast, severely curtails counterattacks to ambushes executed by way of
nondisclosure of patent rights during the standard-setting process, and
leaves such ambushes largely unchecked.5 More generally, these cases
create arguably conflicting liability rules for standard-setting activities,6
introducing “legal turbulence”7 into this essential process for product
development in many high-technology markets.
This iBrief joins other commentary objecting to the confusion in
antitrust law8 and potential adverse incentives9 arising in the wake of
Qualcomm and Rambus. Unlike other scholarship, this iBrief argues that
¶3

3

Rambus, Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct.
1318 (2009).
4
See Damien Geradin et al., The Complements Problem Within Standard
Setting: Assessing the Evidence on Royalty Stacking, 14 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L.
144, 173–74 (2008) (“The majority of SSOs have far more IPR licensees than
IPR holders, so the risk of concerted buyer power to hold royalties below their
competitive level strikes us as a very real concern.”); see also RAYMOND T.
NIMMER, LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY § 4:58 (2009) (“[Qualcomm] creates
numerous potential traps for rights owners who participate in SSOs, perhaps
creating incentives for them not to do so.”).
5
J. Thomas Rosch, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks, LSI 4th
Antitrust Conference on Standard Setting and Patent Pools (Oct. 2, 2008),
available at 2008 WL 4519192 (“[T]he Commission will have to decide
whether it will continue to prioritize [ambush] cases if the D.C. Circuit’s
decision is allowed to stand.”).
6
Compare Rambus, 522 F.3d at 466 (“[Qualcomm conflicts with Supreme Court
precedent] to the extent that it [held] . . . that there is a cognizable violation of
the Sherman Act when a lawful monopolist’s deceit has the effect of raising
prices (without an effect on competitive structure).”) with George S. Cary et al.,
Antitrust Implications of Abuse of Standard-Setting, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV.
1241, 1252 (2008) (“Although the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Rambus and the
Third Circuit’s decision in [Qualcomm] led to different outcomes for the
defendants in each case, the two rulings are not necessarily in tension.”).
7
See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 929
(2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (using the phrase “legal turbulence” to describe
the negative business consequences of uncertainty in antitrust law).
8
See M. Sean Royall & Adam J. Di Vincenzo, The FTC’s N-Data Consent
Order: A Missed Opportunity to Clarify Antitrust in Standard Setting, 22
ANTITRUST 83, 84 (2008) (“[O]utside of the narrow [Rambus] fact pattern,
confusion still reigns.”).
9
See Geradin et al., supra note 4, at 173–74; see also NIMMER, supra note 4, §
4:58.
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both approaches are flawed, and the common root of this problem lies in
antitrust doctrine itself as it relates to patent ambushes.
Liability for monopolization under Section 2 of the Sherman Act
requires some “bad act” on the part of the monopolist.10 This distinguishes
a monopolist’s acquisition or maintenance of market power through
exclusionary conduct from market success by virtue of “superior skill,
foresight, and industry.”11 The Qualcomm and Rambus decisions concur
that a patent holder’s deception of a standard-setting organization (“SSO”)
can constitute the requisite exclusionary conduct for a Section 2 violation.12
However, their mutual focus on the patent holder’s conduct is misplaced. In
standardization, the monopoly structure of the market is established by the
consensus of the SSO, not by the acts—good or bad—of the patent holder.13
¶4

10

Dennis Carlton, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Economic for Analysis,
Antitrust Division, U.S. DOJ, Remarks on Single Firm Conduct, in 15 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 1205, 1211 (2008) (“In a Section 2 case, a bad act is alleged.
As a result of the bad act, presumably you’ve created market power or you’ve
increased your market power.”).
11
U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (1945) (“A single producer
may be the survivor out of a group of active competitors, merely by virtue of his
superior skill, foresight and industry. . . . The successful competitor, having been
urged to compete, must not be turned upon when he wins.”). Areeda and Turner
provide the following generally accepted definition of exclusionary conduct:
‘Exclusionary’ conduct is conduct, other than competition on
the merits or restraints reasonably ‘necessary’ to competition
on the merits, that reasonably appears capable of making a
significant contribution to creating or maintaining monopoly
power.
PHILLIP E. AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW § 651f (2007).
Notably, antitrust doctrine has undergone ebbs and flows over the
years, and the stringency of the “bad act” requirement has at times, as in the
Alcoa case itself, been a nearly non-existent criterion. See William E. Kovacic,
The Intellectual DNA Of Modern U.S. Competition Law For Dominant Firm
Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 17
(2007) (“Although Section 2 cases in this period [including Alcoa] continued to
insist on some element of bad acts, the courts defined the concept of wrongful
behavior so broadly that a wide range of conduct sufficed to create liability for
dominant firms.”).
12
See Royall & Di Vincenzo, supra note 8, at 84 (“In light of these cases, it is
now clear that deceptive acts designed to subvert a standard-setting process with
the ultimate goal of transforming a benevolent industry standard into a private
monopoly can lead to antitrust liability . . . under Section 2 of the Sherman
Act.”).
13
See NIMMER, supra note 4, § 4:58 (“Antitrust law only precludes actions that
adversely affect the competitive process—not conduct that might harm
particular competitors or increase the value of particular products or
technologies. . . . Non-disclosure is not an antitrust issue unless there is an anti-
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Consequently, the severity of antitrust punishments may be unwarranted,
yet at the same time, patent royalty windfalls are undeserved. Antitrust
simply does not fit the patent ambush problem, and alternate remedies are
required.
Part I of this iBrief discusses the process of standard-setting and the
roles of the various SSO participants. Part II examines early antitrust case
law addressing patent ambushes. Part III critiques the Qualcomm and
Rambus decisions. Part IV discusses the fundamental inadequacy of
antitrust doctrine to handle patent ambush.
¶5

I. STANDARDIZATION AND PATENT AMBUSHES
The principal benefits of formal (as opposed to de facto)
standardization14 are twofold: standards facilitate the development of
systems of complementary products15 and permit entry by competing firms
at multiple points of the supply chain. Standards facilitate vertical
segmentation of supply, allowing firms to specialize in specific components
without producing complete systems.16 Standards also facilitate horizontal
competition, allowing multiple firms to supply competing products with
equivalent functionality and common specifications.17
¶6

Standardization is particularly prevalent in high-tech markets. A
computer processor chip, for example, has limited utility without a hard
drive, operating memory, and input/output components. Standards facilitate
the interconnectivity of these different components, allowing the
manufacturers of each individual piece to follow common blueprints that
¶7

competitive impact. The fact that it may harm some competitors or increase the
price of a product does not qualify.”).
14
See generally Carl Shapiro, Setting Compatibility Standards: Cooperation or
Collusion, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 81, 83–84 (Rochelle C.
Dreyfuss et al., eds., 2001). A technology can become standardized through
either a dynamic or a formal process. In de facto standardization firms
individually adopt the technology in their respective businesses. In de jure or
formal standardization, an industry organization or government agency chooses
a particular technological specification, and market participants may voluntarily
adopt the standard.
15
Id. at 82 (“Standards are an inevitable outgrowth of systems, whereby
complementary products work in concert to meet users’ needs.”).
16
Id. (“[Standards may be set] among companies selling complementary
components that work together to form a system, as when Intel and Microsoft
team up to make sure that their chips and operating system function smoothly in
concert.”).
17
Id. (“[C]ompanies that compete directly with one another [may] agree on
compatibility or interface standards to build sufficient support for a new
technology.”).
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specify the physical interface, communication protocols, and other features
that enable interoperability.18 The polar opposite framework is proprietary
systems, where all components are designed or controlled by a single firm.19
The benefits of standardization inure to product suppliers and
consumers. Standard-setting often spurs investment in new technology
markets, as suppliers can expect the market to expand and are assured that
new products will be met with demand.20 Prior to standardization, existing
firms compete fiercely to win selection of their technologies by the SSO.
After the standard is selected, however, competition is redirected to the
downstream product markets, as firms adopt the chosen specification and
develop competitive niches for their products.21 In turn, consumers benefit
through increased choice, enhanced quality, and lower prices.22
¶8

A patent ambush can frustrate both supply-side efficiencies and
demand-side advantages. Standards often include proprietary technologies,
and SSOs typically require that patent holders disclose their rights ex ante
(before standardization) and agree to license their rights at reasonable and
nondiscriminatory (“RAND”) rates ex post (after standardization).23 To be
“reasonable,” RAND royalty rates must be defined in relation to ex ante
¶9

18

For example, computer buses provide standardized interfaces that facilitate
interoperability of multiple distinct components. See Bus (computing),
WIKIPEDIA, http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bus_(computing) (last visited
Mar. 23, 2009).
19
See Apple to Use Intel Microprocessors Beginning in 2006, APPLE.COM,
http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2005/jun/06intel.html (last visited Mar. 23,
2009). Apple, for example, uses this model. But, as demonstrated by their
switch to Intel processors, firms using proprietary models often cannot match
the competitive advantages of specialized component manufacturers.
20
As phrased by the Qualcomm court: “Standard setting . . . reduces the risk to
producers . . . of investing scarce resources in a technology that ultimately may
not gain widespread acceptance.” Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm, Inc., 501 F.3d
297, 309 (3d Cir. 2007).
21
See Rambus, Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 459 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“Before an
SSO adopts a standard, there is often vigorous competition among different
technologies for incorporation into that standard. After standardization,
however, the dynamic typically shifts, as industry members begin adhering to
the standard and the standardized features start to dominate.”); see also Daniel
F. Spulber, Unlocking Technology: Antitrust and Innovation, 4 J. COMPETITION
L. & ECON. 915, 942 (2008) (“Firms have a strong incentive to adapt their
products to market standards to obtain a share of the market.”).
22
See Qualcomm, 501 F.3d at 308–09 (listing the consumer benefits of formal
standard-setting).
23
Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting
Organizations, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1889, 1906 (2002) (surveying the bylaws of
forty-three SSOs and finding that the majority required licensing of standardized
intellectual property on RAND terms).
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market power, thereby rewarding the patent holder for the value of her
innovation in a competitive market.24 In an ambush, however, the holder of
an essential patent (the “standard-owner”) either avoids disclosing its rights
ex ante or breaches its RAND commitment ex post, and thereby seeks
supra-competitive royalties from the market participants who have become
locked-in (the “standard-users”). In so doing, the patent holder reaps a
“windfall,”25 which may come at the expense of reduced choices and
increased market prices for the standardized technology.26

II. EARLY ANTITRUST PRECEDENT
Several legal theories have been invoked to combat patent
ambushes, and antitrust has been used with increasing prevalence.27 Indeed,
antitrust is a good candidate in theory—by ambushing competitors, the
patent holder exercises monopoly control over the market and causes harm
to consumers.28 But the problem is not so simple. A patent holder has the
right to exclude competitors from using its technology, and patent rights
may lead to the lawful acquisition of monopoly power, including via
inclusion in a formal standard.29 Also, it is difficult in practice to establish
the causal link between a patent holder’s misconduct in connection with a
standard and the resulting antitrust harm of market monopolization.30 In
¶10

24

Daniel G. Swanson & William J. Baumol, Reasonable and Nondiscriminatory
(RAND) Royalties, Standards Selection, and Control of Market Power, 73
ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 10–11 (2005) (“[T]he concept of a “reasonable” royalty for
purposes of RAND licensing must be defined and implemented by reference to
ex ante competition, i.e., competition in advance of standard selection.”).
25
Cary et al., supra note 6, at 1242.
26
Id. at 1262 (“[Patent ambush] can cause extensive harm to consumer welfare
by undermining the reliability and viability of standard-setting, raising the costs
of goods, and slowing innovation.”).
27
See generally Lemley, supra note 28 (discussing contract, patent, and antitrust
theories of liability for patent ambush); see also Royall & Di Vincenzo, supra
note 8, at 84.
28
Joseph Farrell et al., Standard Setting, Patents, and Hold-Up, 74 ANTITRUST
L.J. 603, 609 (2007) (“[Patent ambush] is not merely a private contracting
problem, but an antitrust problem.”).
29
See Qualcomm, 501 F.3d at 314 (discussing the implications of patent rights
to standard setting).
30
See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 28, at 1931 (“[T]he competitive risk is that the
misrepresentation will cause an SSO to adopt a standard it otherwise would have
rejected, and that the adoption of that standard will in turn confer on the
defendant market power it would not otherwise have obtained. This is a rather
long chain of inferences.”).
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general, the plaintiff must prove that the SSO would have adopted a nonproprietary standard but for the patent holder’s deception.31
The earliest attempts to apply antitrust doctrine to patent ambushes
emerged in the form of consent decrees issued by the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC). These decrees failed to establish guidelines for private
litigation and prompted widespread criticism, particularly when the
Commission exercised its jurisdiction under Section 5 of the FTC Act.32
Later, the Commission began to litigate monopolization actions under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act.33 Competitors in standardized markets also
began bringing private actions under the Sherman Act, with varying degrees
of success.34 As discussed below, these initial attempts foreshadowed the
larger problems that would emerge from antitrust challenges to patent
ambushes, specifically the tenuous nature of the antitrust claims against
patent holders and the potential for abuse by licensees. (Given the high cost
and uncertain outcomes of litigation, these two problems are not necessarily
mutually exclusive.)
¶11

A. The Dell Consent Decree
In the 1996 Dell consent decree, the Commission claimed that
Dell’s alleged ex ante misrepresentations and ex post enforcement of its
patent rights violated Section 5 of the FTC Act.35 The Commission’s
theory was that
¶12

[o]nce [the] standard had become widely accepted, the standard
effectively conferred market power upon Dell as the patent holder.
This market power was not inevitable: had [the SSO] known of the
Dell patent, it could have chosen an equally effective, non-proprietary
standard.36
31

Id.; see also Rambus, Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 463–64 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(“[I]f Rambus’s more complete disclosure would have caused JEDEC to adopt a
different (open, non-proprietary) standard, then its failure to disclose harmed
competition . . . if Rambus’s conduct merely enabled it to avoid . . . RAND
licensing terms, such conduct, alone, could not be said to harm competition.”).
32
See Royall & Di Vincenzo, supra note 8, at 83 (criticizing the Commission’s
consent order in Dell).
33
Id. (“[T]he Commission brought two cases, Rambus and Unocal, that . . . were
rooted firmly in Sherman Act case law.”).
34
See infra, Part II.D (discussing early private litigation). The Qualcomm
decision cemented the requirements for stating a cause of action against patent
ambush under § 2 of the Sherman Act. Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm, Inc., 501
F.3d 297, 314 (3d Cir. 2007).
35
Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616 (1996); see Cary et al., supra note 6, at
1246–47 (discussing Dell).
36
Cary et al., supra note 6, at 1247 (citing Dell, 121 F.T.C. at 626 n.2).

2010

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 017

In Dell, a company representative had stated to the SSO ex ante, in
accordance with disclosure mandates, that the company did not hold patent
rights over the proposed standard.37 After adoption of the standard, Dell
sought to assert its patents against standard-users, and the FTC commenced
its challenge. The resulting consent decree precluded Dell from enforcing
its patents against any users of the standard.38 Nonetheless, the Dell order
was not without controversy, and Commissioner Azcuenaga dissented at the
time that “[t]he complaint against Dell does not articulate a violation of
Section 5 of the FTC Act under any established theory of law. Under any
novel theory, the competitive implications of the conduct alleged remain
unclear.”39
¶13

B. The Unocal Consent Decree
Unlike Dell, the Unocal consent decree in 200540 was “rooted
firmly in Sherman Act case law.”41 Unocal had participated in a
governmental standard-setting process regarding reformulated gasoline
specifications, without disclosing its pending patent claims. After the
standard was adopted by the California Air Resources Board (CARB),
Unocal proceeded to amend its patent applications to more precisely read on
the regulatory standard. In so doing, Unocal had effectively patented the
standard itself, in that it was able to “capture[] almost any practicable
formulation for meeting the CARB regulations.”42
¶14

The FTC’s action was initially dismissed by the administrative law
judge (ALJ) under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine of immunity for private
lobbying efforts of governmental bodies.43 However, the Commission
reversed, finding that Unocal had committed fraud before the CARB and
therefore was not immune from liability.44 The Commission held that
“misrepresentations to [SSO’s] would be actionable if they caused
¶15

37

See Lemley, supra note 28, at 1928 (“Each of the members who voted to
adopt the standard, including Dell Computer Corporation, was required by
VESA rules to affirm that it did not own any patent rights that covered the VLBus standard, and Dell's representative did in fact make such a statement.”).
38
Dell, 121 F.T.C. at 626.
39
Id. at 627 (dissenting statement of Commissioner Mary L. Azcuenaga); see
also Royall & Di Vincenzo, supra note 8, at 83 (“[The] 1996 consent order with
Dell Computer Company . . . was hardly a model of clarity.”).
40
Chevron Corp., 140 F.T.C. 100 (2005).
41
Royall & Di Vincenzo, supra note 8, at 83 (discussing Unocal).
42
Scott H. Segal, Fuel for Thought: Clean Gasoline and Dirty Patents, 51 AM.
U. L. REV. 49, 61 (2001).
43
In re Union Oil Co. of California, No. 9305, *1-*2 (F.T.C. Nov. 25, 2003).
44
See Cary et al., supra note 6, at 1247–48 (discussing the procedural
background in Unocal).
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substantial competitive harm from their ‘own force in the marketplace.’”45
Following remand, Unocal and Chevron entered a consent decree with the
FTC and conceded enforceability of the patents, in connection with the
pending merger of the two companies.46 Accordingly, Unocal set the stage
for subsequent Sherman Act litigation by licensees of a standardized patent,
but again fell short of offering clear precedent for private suits.

C. The N-Data Consent Decree
Another permutation of patent ambush arose in N-Data, leading to
another FTC consent decree.47 In N-Data, the original patent holder had
fully disclosed its rights and committed to licensing restrictions for its
standardized patent, but subsequently had assigned the patent to a spin-off
entity.48 Not contractually bound by the agreement between the original
patent holder and the SSO, the assignee (and its subsequent assignee, NData) proceeded to seek higher royalties from standard-users.49 Utilizing its
Section 5 authority, the Commission characterized the transaction as both
an “unfair method of competition” and an “unfair act or practice.”50 The
Commission reached a consent decree with the assignee that limited
licensing of the patent to the licensing terms agreed to by the assignor.51
¶16

In support of the decree, FTC Commissioner Rosch justified
applying Section 5 to circumstances of ambush in which standard-users are
unable to defend themselves. He argued that
¶17

in the standard-setting context—with numerous, injured third parties,
big and small, who lack privity with the patentee and with the mixed
incentives generated when members must decide whether to pass on
royalties that raise costs market-wide— . . . Section 5 intervention may
serve an unusually important role.52

The decree, however, has faced widespread criticism, both for
straying from established precedent and for its failure to guide future
¶18

45

Id. (quoting In re Union Oil Co. of California, 138 F.T.C. 1, 37 (2004)).
Id.
47
Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, 2008 WL 258308, *32 (F.T.C. Jan. 22,
2008).
48
Royall & Di Vincenzo, supra note 8, at 84 (discussing the facts in N-Data).
49
Id.
50
Rosch, supra note 5, § II (“[A] majority of the Commission condemned NData’s conduct as both an unfair method of competition and an unfair act or
practice.”).
51
See Cary et al., supra note 6, at 1256 (citing Negotiated Data Solutions, 2008
WL 258308, at *32) (“The FTC filed a simultaneous complaint and settlement
under which N-Data [the transferee] is obliged to abide by National's initial
commitment to the IEEE [the transferor].”).
52
Rosch, supra note 5, § II.
46
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litigants.53 Not only is the FTC Act enforceable by the Commission and not
by private litigants;54 the standards of liability under Section 5 are also
sufficiently different from the requirement of exclusionary conduct under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act that they fail to give guidance to private
litigants.55
Yet even under the FTC Act, it is unclear what exactly was “unfair”
about the conduct of either the original patent holder or its assignee. Once
the original patent holder had agreed to license on RAND terms, a
legitimate arbitrage opportunity arose for it to sell the patents rights to an
unconstrained entity. SSOs can readily impose restrictions on assignment
in the original RAND commitment, or create conditions that the assignee
agrees to be bound thereby, or provide rights of first refusal for any
transfers of the standardized patents, or other contractual protections.
¶19

In this light, antitrust liability under either the FTC Act or the more
“traditional antitrust law principles” of the Sherman Act56 would frustrate
the private contract rights established between the parties involved.
Furthermore, imposing antitrust liability is less efficient than requiring
parties to protect themselves via contract. Placing the burden on the parties
in ex ante negotiations would allow the patent holder and SSO to bargain
for their desired covenants and restrictions and rely on their enforceability
ex post.57 Unlike in ambushes involving deception, SSOs who are aware of
the patent rights covering the standard under consideration are readily able
to restrict a standard-owner’s future opportunities for transfer arbitrage.
¶20

D. Early Private Litigation
Initial attempts at private litigation under the Sherman Act
encountered mixed results. In Townshend v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., the
district court dismissed a claim brought by standard-users for the standard¶21

53

See Royall & Di Vincenzo, supra note 8, at 84 (“[B]y failing to rely at least in
part upon Sherman Act principles in support of its proposed order, the
Commission has missed a significant opportunity to further clarify how
traditional antitrust law principles apply in this immensely important
commercial setting.”).
54
See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2006).
55
See Royall & Di Vincenzo, supra note 8, at 90 (“The Commission’s silence
on Section 2 issues in N-Data, at a very minimum, creates uncertainty and doubt
concerning the extent to which antitrust will protect against opportunistic
conduct in this setting.”).
56
Id. at 84.
57
Of course, bankruptcy of the standard-owner could frustrate enforceability of
RAND-related covenants and conditions on assignment, but certain bankruptcy
protections could be imposed.
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owner’s alleged violation of its ex ante licensing commitments.58 In that
case, the standard-owner had submitted proposed licensing terms to the
SSO that violated the SSO’s rules, and furthermore had failed to disclose
certain litigation relating to its patents.59 The court dismissed the suit
because the licensing terms at issue had been vetted by the SSO ex ante
notwithstanding violation of its policies, and the SSO had not relied on the
nondisclosure of the patent-related litigation when adopting the standard.60
Conversely, in ESS Tech v. PC-Tel, the district court held that ex
ante misrepresentation of the standard-owner’s willingness to license on
RAND terms could support a Sherman Act claim.61 Lemley notes that “ESS
has parallels to Dell . . . the only significant difference is that the patentee
misrepresented its willingness to license a patent [in ESS] rather than the
existence of the patent itself [in Dell].”62 Accordingly, under ESS, ex ante
misrepresentation may constitute a “bad act” sufficient to give rise to an
antitrust claim. However, as Townsend demonstrated, the “bad act” must be
causally linked to the standard-owner’s acquisition of monopoly control
over the standard, in order to constitute a violation of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act.
¶22

III. THE QUALCOMM AND RAMBUS DECISIONS
The principal question presented in Qualcomm was “what facts
must be pled to survive a motion to dismiss” on a Section 2 claim alleging
a patent-holder’s deception before an SSO;63 conversely, Rambus addressed
the requirements for establishing causation under Section 2 based on such
alleged deception.64 Because they address these different legal issues, the
two cases can be read as non-contradictory, if taken at face value.65
Beneath the surface, however, a fundamental conflict exists between the
decisions’ respective conceptions of monopolization due to a patent
ambush. As discussed below, Qualcomm disadvantages the standard-owner
by permitting an antitrust suit against it for any proposed licensing terms
¶23

58

No. C99-0400SBA, 2000 WL 433505 at *9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2000).
Id. at *2.
60
Id. at *10–11; see also Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm, Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 312
n.7 (3d Cir. 2007) (distinguishing Townshend on these facts).
61
No. C-99-20292, 1999 WL 33520483, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 1999).
62
Lemley, supra note 28, at 1930.
63
Qualcomm, 501 F.3d at 303.
64
Rambus, Inc. v. F.T.C., 522 F.3d 456, 459 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
65
See id. at 466 (“To the extent that [Qualcomm] . . . rested on the argument that
deceit lured the SSO away from non-proprietary technology, it cannot help the
Commission in view of its inability to find that Rambus’s behavior caused
JEDEC’s choice.” (internal citations omitted)); see also Cary et al., supra note 6,
at 1252 (“[T]he two rulings are not necessarily in tension.”).
59
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that arguably overstep the RAND constraints. Conversely, Rambus
effectively disables antitrust remedies in cases of nondisclosure. Though
this outcome aligns with this iBrief’s thesis, the Rambus opinion is fraught
with error and its implications are equally disturbing.66

A. The Qualcomm Decision
In Qualcomm, the Third Circuit upheld the applicability of
monopolization claims under the Sherman Act to alleged patent ambushes.
At the outset, the court acknowledged the two main counterarguments to its
position: first, patent rights permit the exercise of monopoly power through
price and access restrictions,67 and second, antitrust liability is only proper
where the competitive process itself has been harmed, not only individual
competitors.68 The court dismissed these arguments,69 however, and
proceeded to expound the risks of “patent hold-up” in formal standardsetting70 and the harms caused to competition by the exercise of monopoly
power in standardized markets.71
¶24

Citing prior FTC enforcement actions for patent ambushes,72 most
notably the “landmark, 120-page opinion in In the Matter of Rambus,
¶25

66

See infra, Part IV.B.
Qualcomm, 501 F.3d at 305 (“In dismissing Broadcom’s claim of
monopolization in the WCDMA technology markets, the Court reasoned that
Qualcomm enjoyed a legally-sanctioned monopoly in its patented technology,
and that this monopoly conferred the right to exclude competition and set the
terms by which that technology was distributed.”).
68
Id. at 308 (“Conduct that merely harms competitors . . . while not harming the
competitive process itself, is not anticompetitive.”).
69
Id. at 305 (“The [district court] did not discuss the possibility that the FRAND
commitments that SDOs required of vendors were intended as a bulwark against
unlawful monopoly, nor did it consider the possibility that the SDOs might have
chosen nonproprietary technologies for inclusion in the standard.”).
70
Id. at 310.
71
The Third Circuit discussed a number of harms resulting from patent
ambushes, many of which have been previously noted in the foregoing analysis.
The Court explained that “[i]nefficiency may be injected into the standardsetting process by what is known as ‘patent hold-up.’” Id. Furthermore, an
ambush increases the bargaining power of the patent holder, permitting it to
charge supra-competitive prices in excess of its normal entitlement under the
patent grant. Id. (“Although a patent confers a lawful monopoly over the
claimed invention . . . its value is limited when alternative technologies exist.”).
Therefore, patent ambushes harm competition, in addition to competitors, by
“obscuring the costs of including proprietary technology in a standard and
increasing the likelihood that patent rights will confer monopoly power on the
patent holder.” Id.
72
Id. at 310–12 (discussing Dell, Unocal, and the Commission’s decision in
Rambus).
67
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Inc.,”73 the Third Circuit highlighted the “growing awareness of the risks
associated with deceptive conduct in the private standard-setting process.”74
This portion of the opinion has been recognized as “a facially sound
analysis that highlights what many have considered to be wrong about
deceptive conduct or nondisclosure by rights owners in standards-setting
groups.”75 However, the remainder of the Qualcomm opinion is more
controversial, both in terms of its practical implications,76 and in its possible
conflict with the D.C. Circuit’s Rambus decision.77
The Qualcomm court enumerated the elements of its holding, as
follows:
¶26

(1) in a consensus-oriented private standard-setting environment, (2) a
patent holder’s intentionally false promise to license essential
proprietary technology on FRAND terms, (3) coupled with an SDO's
reliance on that promise when including the technology in a standard,
and (4) the patent holder’s subsequent breach of that promise, is
actionable anticompetitive conduct.78

Still, the actual parameters of this rule are not so easily discernible.
Nimmer highlights the ambiguities in the holding, including “what conduct
establishes a failure to perform the RAND obligation,” given that SSO’s
rules regarding disclosure and licensing are often unclear.79 Indeed, since
the definition of “reasonable and non-discriminatory” is highly subjective,
any disagreement during licensing negotiations could permit standard-users
to bring antitrust complaints against the standard-owner, or threaten the
same and their risk of treble damages and patent unenforceability to gain
leverage. Accordingly, this could facilitate oligopsonistic exploitation of
the standard-owner to depress royalties below competitive rates.80
¶27

The other issue with Qualcomm concerns its laudation of and
reliance on the FTC’s Rambus decision,81 which presents an unavoidable
¶28

73

Id. at 311.
Id. at 312.
75
NIMMER, supra note 4, § 4:58.
76
Id. (“[The Qualcomm] holding creates numerous potential traps for rights
owners who participate in SSOs, perhaps creating incentives for them not to do
so.”).
77
Rambus, Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
78
Qualcomm, 501 F.3d at 314.
79
NIMMER, supra note 4, § 4:58.
80
Cf. Geradin et al., supra note 4, at 173–74 (“The majority of SSOs have far
more IPR licensees than IPR holders, so the risk of concerted buyer power to
hold royalties below their competitive level strikes us as a very real concern.”).
81
See Qualcomm, 501 F.3d at 312 (“[The Commission’s In re Rambus decision]
is particularly noteworthy for its extensive discussion of deceptive conduct in
74
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conflict with the D.C. Circuit’s subsequent reversal of the Commission’s
order. As discussed further below, the D.C. Circuit attempted to avoid
confrontation with the Third Circuit’s decision:
To the extent that [Qualcomm] (which simply reversed a grant of
dismissal) rested on the argument that deceit lured the SSO away from
non-proprietary technology, it cannot help the Commission in view of
its inability to find that Rambus’s behavior caused JEDEC’s choice.82

The D.C. Circuit only acknowledged a potential conflict “to the
extent that [Qualcomm held] that there is a cognizable violation of the
Sherman Act when a lawful monopolist’s deceit has the effect of raising
prices (without an effect on competitive structure).”83 This is a coy
statement, because the Third Circuit’s decision in Qualcomm relies on the
traditional criteria for monopolization, including the “intentional acquisition
of monopoly power” by way of deception,84 as well as the increase in the
“likelihood that patent rights will confer monopoly power on the patent
holder” caused by the deception.85
¶29

Unlike Rambus, the Qualcomm opinion did not exclusively
highlight the SSO’s reliance on Qualcomm’s misrepresentations as the butfor cause of its resulting monopoly power. The Third Circuit extensively
discussed the RAND mechanism, and its function to provide a “bulwark
against unlawful monopoly.”86 The Court emphasized that “measures such
as [RAND] commitments [are] important safeguards against monopoly
power.”87
¶30

By contrast, the D.C. Circuit reasoned that “an otherwise lawful
monopolist’s end-run around [RAND] price constraints, even when
deceptive or fraudulent, does not alone present a harm to competition.” 88
The direct tension between the circuits lies in their respective conceptions
of the RAND commitment and whether it prevents the acquisition of
monopoly power by a standard-owner or merely caps the price that the
owner of a standardized patent may charge. Phrased another way, Rambus
views the RAND commitment as preventing the exercise of monopoly
power that the standard-owner lawfully holds, whereas Qualcomm focuses
¶31

the standard-setting context and the factors that make such conduct
anticompetitive under § 2 of the Sherman Act.”).
82
Rambus, 522 F.3d at 466 (internal citation omitted).
83
Id.
84
Qualcomm, 501 F.3d at 304.
85
Id. at 314.
86
Id. at 305.
87
Id. at 314.
88
Rambus, 522 F.3d at 466.
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more on the economic equivalence between creating monopoly power in the
first instance versus avoiding restraints on its exercise.

B. The Rambus Decision
Whereas the Qualcomm decision can be read as creating incentives
for standard-users to sue (or threaten to sue) standard-owners who have
committed to RAND licensing, the Rambus decision institutes a crucial
limitation on antitrust actions against patent ambushes involving ex ante
nondisclosure—perhaps, in fact, a debilitating one. The D.C. Circuit held
that ex ante nondisclosure to an SSO, enabling a standard-owner to “avoid
[RAND commitments] on its patent licensing fees that the SSO would have
imposed as part of its normal process of standardizing patented technologies
. . . . [does] not in itself constitute monopolization.”89 The opinion has
spurred considerable controversy, both concerning the holding itself as well
as the reasoning underlying it.90
¶32

Rambus arose from the company’s appeal of the Commission’s
finding of monopolization under Section 2 of the Sherman Act for its ex
ante nondisclosure of certain patent applications and claim amendments that
eventually read on standards adopted by the Joint Electron Device
Engineering Council (JEDEC). The standards related to random-access
memory (RAM) in computers. The factual circumstances are convoluted
and are complicated by Rambus’s intermittent participation in JEDEC,91 the
¶33

89

Id. at 459.
Compare Justin Hurwitz, The Value of Patents in Industry Standards:
Avoiding Licensing Arbitrage with Voluntary Rules, 36 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 15 (2008)
(“It is indefensible for the Commissioners to have usurped the ALJ’s traditional
role once again. Rambus has already begun its appeal—this is an appeal that
will very likely be won.”), NIMMER, supra note 4, § 4:58 (“[T]he DC Circuit
restored some rationality to antitrust law regarding standards-setting
organizations (SSOs) in its review and reversal of the FTC ruling in the Rambus
case.”), and Stephen H. Haber et al., On the Importance to Economic Success of
Property Rights in Finance and Innovation, 26 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 215, 236
(2008) (“[E]ven though the Federal Trade Commission found against Rambus,
the Commission itself had trouble identifying the exact wrong it found Rambus
to have committed . . . . This lack of support explains why the Commission’s
decision was set aside by the [D.C.] Circuit.”), with Cary et al., supra note 6, at
1252 (“[T]he Rambus decision has at least two fundamental flaws in its
application of Section Two of the Sherman Act.”), and Rosch, supra note 5, §
III (“I personally support a petition for certiorari in Rambus. I think the D.C.
Circuit’s decision is wrong . . . .”).
91
See Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Techs. Ag, 318 F.3d 1081, 1105 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(“Rambus attended its last JEDEC meeting on December 6, 1995, and formally
withdrew from JEDEC by a letter dated June 17, 1996. JEDEC did not begin
formal work on the DDR-SDRAM standard until December 1996.”).
90
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lack of clarity in JEDEC’s rules,92 the sensitive nature of strategic
amendments to pending patent claims,93 and criminal antitrust violations
committed by other JEDEC participants.94
Indeed, the D.C. Circuit should have focused on the factual record
and reversed under the substantial evidence standard, rather than articulate a
resounding legal rule applicable to all future instances of alleged ambush.95
Instead, the court held that ex ante deceptive conduct towards an SSO that
enables the future standard-owner to avoid making RAND commitments for
its ex post licensing to standard-users does not, in itself, violate the Sherman
Act.96
¶34

The D.C. Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in NYNEX
Corp. v. Discon, Inc.97 to justify its holding that avoidance of RAND limits
does not constitute monopolization under Section 2.98 Citing NYNEX in
cursory fashion, the court explained that “an otherwise lawful monopolist’s
use of deception simply to obtain higher prices normally has no particular
tendency to exclude rivals and thus to diminish competition.”99
¶35

92

Id. at 1102 (“[T]here is a staggering lack of defining details in the EIA/JEDEC
patent policy.”).
93
See Thomas J. Scott et al., Proscribed Conduct for Patent Holders
Participating in Standard-Setting Organizations, 20 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J.
14, 14 (2008) (“[T]he disclosure of patents, and particularly of patent
applications, carries with it inherent risks to which companies might, justifiably,
be . . . averse.”).
94
See Haber et al., supra note 90, at 236 (“The particular irony is . . . that the
complaining DRAM manufacturers, Hynix and Infineon, have recently settled
with the U.S. government in one of the largest criminal antitrust price fixing
cases ever, involving fines now totaling over half a billion dollars and jail
sentences for several of the conspiring executives.”).
95
In discussing the possibility of § 5 liability, the D.C. Circuit noted that “the
Commission’s findings are conclusive so long as they are supported by
substantial evidence,” but then proceeded to question the sufficiency of the
evidentiary record “on both the relevant margins: what JEDEC’s disclosure
policies were, and what, within those mandates, Rambus failed to disclose.”
Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 467 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
96
See J. Thomas Rosch, The Common Law of Section 2: Is It Still Alive and
Well?, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1163, 1173 (2008) (“We at the Commission
were very mindful of Chicago School scholarship and of the Supreme Court’s
recent jurisprudence in deciding Rambus, and I assume that the Third Circuit
was similarly mindful of it in deciding Qualcomm. But we were not convinced
that deceptive conduct in the context of a standard-setting process could or
should be considered presumptively legal, much less legal [per se].”).
97
525 U.S. 128 (1998).
98
See Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 464–65 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
99
Id. at 464.
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However, NYNEX is not on point. NYNEX addressed “the specific
legal question [of] whether an antitrust court considering an agreement by a
buyer to purchase goods or services from one supplier rather than another
should . . . apply the per se rule if it finds no legitimate business reason for
that purchasing decision.”100 There, a regulatory agency imposed a
permanent restraint on prices, and the defendant-monopolist allegedly
conspired with its downstream supplier to be billed at inflated prices, pass
down these costs to consumers through higher regulated prices that were
calculated based on its supplier’s invoices, and then split the difference with
its supplier via kickbacks.101 These facts are distinguishable from Rambus,
in which the defendant’s alleged deception occurred ex ante and affected
whether a constraint on ex post prices (similar to the regulatory oversight in
NYNEX) would be imposed at all.102
¶36

Further, it is not at all clear that the “mere avoidance” of a RAND
commitment ex ante would not, in itself, constitute unlawful acquisition of
market power under the Sherman Act.103 The definition of market power is
the ability to sustain prices above competitive rates.104 Whereas dominant
or even complete market share may support an inference of power, proof of
an inability to maintain supra-competitive pricing will refute the possibility
that the defendant is a monopolist.105 Reciprocally, avoidance of a
¶37

100

NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 135 (1998).
Id. at 132 (“[Defendant] could pass the higher prices . . . on to telephone
consumers in the form of higher regulatory-agency-approved telephone service
charges. At the end of the year, [defendant] would receive a special rebate from
[its over-charging supplier] . . . .”).
102
See Cary et al., supra note 6, at 1253 (“[NYNEX] has no bearing on the use of
deception to obtain monopoly power in the first instance.”); see also Rosch,
supra note 5, § I (“As numerous other commentators have noted, the court’s
reading of NYNEX was unwarranted because the defendant in that case acquired
monopoly power lawfully whereas the Commission found that Rambus’s
acquisition of that power was unlawful.”).
103
See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 50 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“The
offense of monopolization has two elements: ‘(1) the possession of monopoly
power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of
that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a
superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.’” (quoting United States
v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966))).
104
See id. at 51 (“The Supreme Court defines monopoly power as ‘the power to
control prices or exclude competition.’ More precisely, a firm is a monopolist if
it can profitably raise prices substantially above the competitive level.” (quoting
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956))).
105
See, e.g., id. at 54 (“Although the ‘existence of [monopoly] power ordinarily
may be inferred from the predominant share of the market,’ . . . because of the
possibility of competition from new entrants, looking to current market share
alone can be ‘misleading.’” (alteration in original) (citations omitted)).
101
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permanent ex post restraint on pricing power should constitute
monopolization, even though the standard-owner would otherwise have
obtained a dominant market share by virtue of standardization.106
A second basis for criticizing the D.C. Circuit’s decision is its
initial bifurcation of the consequences of Rambus’s alleged deception,
which led the court to treat the “mere avoidance” of RAND limits as a
separate necessary premise of liability.
The majority of FTC
Commissioners had found that if Rambus had disclosed its patent
applications and pending amendments, “JEDEC either would have excluded
Rambus’s patented technologies from the [standards], or would have
demanded RAND assurances . . . .”107 The Commission therefore refused to
render Rambus’s patents unenforceable, as it was unclear whether but for its
deception, JEDEC would have adopted a different standard (rending
Rambus without market power) or instead would have required Rambus to
commit to RAND licensing (rending Rambus without pricing power).108
This occurred in the remedies phase, after the Commission had determined
that Rambus has violated Section 2.
¶38

However, the D.C. Circuit used this finding to determine the issue
of liability. The court reasoned as follows: (A) but for Rambus’s deception,
JEDEC either would have adopted a different (and possibly nonproprietary)
standard or it would have chosen Rambus but imposed RAND
limitations;109 (B) assuming JEDEC would have adopted a nonproprietary
standard, Rambus’s deception may have created a monopoly and violated
Section 2;110 (C) but, if Rambus’s technology would have been included in
the standard anyway subject to RAND limitations, Rambus did not obtain
monopoly power through deceptive means. What this logic fails to consider
¶39

106

Accord Cary et al., supra note 6, at 1253 (“In these alternative scenarios”
without ex ante deception, any standard owner “would be constrained from
controlling prices or excluding competitors. Deceptive actions that avoid any or
all of these alternatives could be anticompetitive.”).
107
Rambus, Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 461 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citing Opinion of
the Commission, In re Rambus, Docket No. 9302, at 74 (F.T.C. July 31, 2006));
see also Rosch, supra note 5, § I (“[Two Commissioners dissented, finding]
strong evidence . . . that if JEDEC had been aware of the potential scope of
Rambus’s patent portfolio, it would have adopted standards that would have
avoided Rambus’s patents.”).
108
Id. at 462.
109
Id. at 463.
110
The Court did not rule on this issue. Id. (“We assume without deciding that
avoidance of the first of these possible outcomes was indeed anticompetitive;
that is, that if Rambus’s more complete disclosure would have caused JEDEC to
adopt a different (open, non-proprietary) standard, then its failure to disclose
harmed competition and would support a monopolization claim.”).
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is that JEDEC would not have adopted Rambus’s technology without a
RAND commitment had it known about the underlying patents.111
The flaw in the court’s reasoning occurred with its initial
conjunction of alternatives: that “the consequences of [Rambus’s]
nondisclosure . . . [were] that it prevented JEDEC either from adopting a
non-proprietary standard, or from extracting a RAND commitment from
Rambus when standardizing its technology.”112 The court required both
alternatives to be satisfied in order to find liability, and after assuming
without deciding that the former could lead to liability,113 the court
proceeded to analyze whether the latter, namely that “Rambus’s conduct
merely enabled it to avoid . . . JEDEC’s obtaining assurances from Rambus
of RAND licensing terms,”114 violated Section 2.
¶40

However, these two “possible outcomes”115 are really one and the
same. Rambus’s avoidance of RAND licensing commitments is
inextricably linked with the inclusion of its patented technology into the
adopted standard. First, consider the underlying logical structure:
According to the Commission’s findings, if (A) Rambus had disclosed its
patents, then either (X) JEDEC would have adopted a different standard or
(Y) JEDEC would have required a RAND commitment from Rambus. The
D.C. Circuit reasoned that the consequences of NOT A (Rambus’s
nondisclosure) were either NOT X (JEDEC did not adopt a different (nonproprietary) standard) or NOT Y (Rambus merely avoided RAND
limitations). However, the logical negative of a conjunction is a
disjunction; that is, NOT A implies NOT X and NOT Y.116 Thus, the
consequences of Rambus’s nondisclosure, based on the facts found by the
Commission, were that JEDEC adopted Rambus’s technology and JEDEC
did not impose RAND limitations.
¶41

This point is supported by other facts on the record that the D.C.
Circuit ignored. Discussing the Commission’s case, the Qualcomm court
noted that JEDEC’s rules prohibited adopting a proprietary standard if its
¶42

111

Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm, Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 317 (3d Cir. 2007) (“If
Rambus had refused to provide the requisite [F]RAND assurances, [the SDO]
would have been bound by its rules to avoid Rambus’s patented technologies.”
(alterations in original) (quoting In re Rambus, Docket No. 9302, at 97 (F.T.C.
Aug. 2, 2006))).
112
Rambus, 522 F.3d at 462.
113
Id. at 463.
114
Id. at 464.
115
Id. at 463.
116
See DEBORAH J. BENNETT, LOGIC MADE EASY: HOW TO KNOW WHEN
LANGUAGE DECEIVES YOU 155 (2004) (“[T]he negation of a conjunction is the
disjunction of the negations of the conjucts. Hence, the propositions ‘not(X or
Y)’ and ‘not-X and not-Y’ are equivalent.”).
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owner refused to commit to RAND licensing.117 That is, JEDEC would
have rejected Rambus’s technology if it had known about the patents but
Rambus had refused to commit to RAND licensing. Accordingly, had
Rambus disclosed its patents, it necessarily would have been required to
commit to RAND licensing or be excluded from the standard.118 Rambus
therefore did not “merely avoid” RAND commitments—it acquired both
structural and economic monopoly power by doing so.
In this light, the Third Circuit was correct in considering RAND
commitments as the “bulwark against unlawful monopoly” power,119 and
reasoning that the deceptive avoidance of RAND limitations is the catalyst
that confers true monopoly power on the standard-owner.120 Especially
given that alternatives to Rambus’s technology had existed ex ante,121
Rambus’s nondisclosure to the SSO created economic monopoly power
where, otherwise, none would have existed.
¶43

IV. THE INADEQUACY OF ANTITRUST TO ADDRESS PATENT AMBUSH
The general rule that emerges from Rambus is that a patent-holder’s
deceptive conduct before an SSO will not give rise to liability under Section
2 if such conduct cannot be shown to have caused the SSO to include that
technology in its standard over an alternative.122 In this respect, the
¶44

117

Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm, Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 317 (3d Cir. 2007) (“If
Rambus had refused to provide the requisite [F]RAND assurances, [the SDO]
would have been bound by its rules to avoid Rambus’s patented technologies.”
(alterations in original) (quoting In re Rambus, Docket No. 9302, at 97 (F.T.C.
Aug. 2, 2006))).
118
Accord Cary et al., supra note 6, at 1253 (“If a patent holder discloses its
intellectual property but declines to commit to license on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms, the SSO could adopt a solution covered by a patent held
by another firm that has made such a commitment.”).
119
Qualcomm, 501 F.3d at 305.
120
Id. at 314 (“The patent holder’s IPRs, if unconstrained, may permit it to
demand supracompetitive royalties. It is in such circumstances that measures
such as FRAND commitments become important safeguards against monopoly
power.”) (internal citation omitted).
121
Cary et al., supra note 6, at 1254 n.99 (“[T]he FTC’s remedy decision
expressly noted that it was taking account of evidence that ‘[a]lternative
technologies were available’ and that ‘it likely would have been possible for
members to design around Rambus’s patents.’” (quoting Opinion of
Commission on Remedy at 17, In re Rambus Inc., Docket No. 9302, (F.T.C.
Feb. 5, 2007))).
122
That is, the court held that deception causing adoption of a proprietary
standard without RAND assurances does not constitute monopolization under
Section 2; as to whether deception causing adoption of a proprietary standard
over alternatives would violate Section 2, the court only “assume[d] without
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holdings of Rambus and Qualcomm do not conflict, because the Third
Circuit expressly required the SSO’s reliance on the deceptive conduct as an
element in actionable deception of an SSO.123 Accordingly, taken together,
the two cases hold that if a patent-holder has engaged in deceptive conduct
ex ante, whether through nondisclosure of its patent rights or a fraudulent
RAND commitment following disclosure, and the SSO would have chosen
a non-proprietary technology but for the deception, then the standard-owner
may be liable under Section 2. One resulting remedy would be to hold the
relevant patents unenforceable against the standard-users,124 whereas
another would be to restrict royalties to reasonable rates. Yet, the decisions
do not mix well, and substantial legal uncertainty and perverse incentives
reside in the interstices between them.

A. Legal Uncertainty Between the Decisions
One unanswered question under Rambus is whether proof of but-for
selection of a different proprietary technology would permit antitrust
liability for the ambush. The Commission found that if Rambus had fully
disclosed its patent position, “JEDEC either would have excluded Rambus’s
patented technologies from the JEDEC DRAM standards, or would have
demanded RAND assurances . . . with an opportunity for ex ante licensing
negotiations.”125
However, the D.C. Circuit mischaracterized the
Commission’s finding as involving the difference between “a different
(open, non-proprietary) standard” and RAND limits on Rambus’s
technology.126
¶45

deciding . . . [that this] would support a monopolization claim.” Rambus, Inc. v.
FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 463-64 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
123
Qualcomm, 501 F.3d at 314; see also Cary et al., supra, note 6, at 1252 (“In
contrast [to Qualcomm], the D.C. Circuit reversed . . . on the grounds that the
FTC failed to prove that an alternative technology could [not] have been adopted
and therefore left open the possibility that Rambus’s technology would have
been incorporated into the standard even if Rambus had not engaged in
deception.”).
124
The remedy requires construction of the but-for market, but under Rambus,
the only possible but-for world that could give rise to liability is the one in
which a different standard would have been adopted by the SSO. Under this
scenario, the patent would likely be ruled unenforceable. See, e.g., Rambus, 522
F.3d at 462 (“[T]he Commission refused to compel Rambus to license its
relevant patents royalty-free because there was insufficient evidence that . . .
such a remedy was necessary to restore competition that would have existed in
the but for world.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
125
Id. (quoting Opinion of the Commission, In re Rambus, Docket No. 9302, at
74 (July 31, 2006)).
126
Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 466 (distinguishing Qualcomm to the
extent it “rested on the argument that deceit lured the SSO away from non-
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Accordingly, it is not immediately clear whether proof of the SSO’s
selection of a different proprietary standard would suffice to give rise to
liability for monopolization. The D.C. Circuit’s reasoning suggests that
proof of a nonproprietary alternative would be required. In relying on
NYNEX for its finding of no Section 2 liability and in its choice of cases in
which deceptive conduct gave rise to antitrust violations, the Court stressed
that “[e]ven if deception raises the price secured by a seller, but does so
without harming competition, it is beyond the antitrust laws’ reach.”127 This
language suggests that deception must alter the structure of the market;
creating a monopoly, not merely permitting the defendant to obtain a
monopoly that otherwise would have been controlled by another firm.
Also, in both cases cited by the court in which a Section 2 violation was
found, the defendant’s deceptive conduct created the monopoly where there
was one, as opposed to merely allowing it to gain control over a
monopolized market.128
¶46

Of course, the difference with standardization, where the standardowner’s deception causes an SSO to choose its technology over another
proprietary alternative, is that the ex post monopoly structure of the market
would exist irrespective of the technology chosen. Rambus makes clear that
the presence or absence of RAND restraints is not a structural feature of a
standardized market, and a standard-owner that is bound by a RAND
commitment is no less a monopolist than one free to set prices at will.129
Whereas a monopoly clearly does not exist when a nonproprietary standard
is adopted, the ex post market structure is identical whether RAND
commitments are imposed or not.
¶47

proprietary technology,” whereas the Commission below had failed to prove
that this alternative necessarily would have occurred) (emphasis added).
127
Id. at 464.
128
In United States v. Microsoft, the D.C. Circuit held that “Microsoft engaged
in anticompetitive conduct when it tricked independent software developers into
believing that its software development tools could be used to design crossplatform Java applications when, in fact, they produced Windows-specific
ones.” Rambus, 522 F.3d at 464 (citing United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253
F.3d 34, 76 (D.C. Cir. 2001)). In Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., the Sixth
Circuit held that the defendant’s “misrepresentations to retailers about the sales
strength of its products versus its competitors’ strength reduced competition in
the monopolized market by increasing the display space devoted to [the
defendant’s] products and decreasing that allotted to competing products.”
Rambus, 522 F.3d at 464 (citing Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d
768 (6th Cir. 2002)).
129
Rambus, 522 F.3d at 466 (“[T]here is [no] cognizable violation of the
Sherman Act when a lawful monopolist’s deceit has the effect of raising prices
(without an effect on competitive structure).”) (emphasis added).
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If, in fact, a non-proprietary, but-for alternative is required for
Section 2 liability, then this will apply both in cases of ex ante
nondisclosure, as well as instances in which a standard-owner had
committed to RAND terms but later breaches. A contract cause of action
may exist as between the SSO and standard-owner in the case of ex post
breach,130 though recourse of standard-users may be limited, and the case of
ex ante nondisclosure would remain unaddressed. However, Rambus does
not conclusively answer this issue. Furthermore, courts in other circuits are
free to follow or disregard Rambus as they see fit in cases of ex post
breach.131
¶48

B. Perverse Incentives Under Antitrust Law
One consequence of the Rambus holding may be to discourage
SSOs from adopting proprietary standards altogether. Lemley explains that
establishing causation will be easier when SSO by-laws preclude
proprietary standards: “If an SSO flatly refuses to adopt any standard
covered by an IP right, for example, as some open source groups do, it
should be apparent that an intentional failure to disclose the existence of an
IP right affected the outcome of the decision.”132 The problem with this
outcome is that the proprietary options may be technologically or otherwise
superior compared with the nonproprietary alternatives.
¶49

The converse scenario is that SSOs may take steps to make proof of
reliance easier to accomplish. Specifically, the SSO might document its
¶50

130

NIMMER, supra note 4, § 4:58 (“If there [has] been actual fraud or breach of
contract, then that is how the claims should [be] brought; but these are not
claims over which FTC typically has jurisdiction.”).
131
As an extreme example, in a recent case involving a patent assignee’s alleged
failure to comply with RAND commitments made by the assignor, a district
court in the Central District of California dismissed the plaintiff’s Section 2
claims against the assignee by following Rambus, but suggested that the
assignor (who was not a party to the litigation) could be liable under Qualcomm:
Vizio cites to [Broadcom] for the proposition that deceiving a
standard setting organization and then evading FRAND
commitments can qualify as anticompetitive conduct and can
constitute harm to competition. . . . However, other courts
[such as the Third Circuit in Rambus] have reached the
opposite conclusion.
....
Although the allegations might suffice to state an antitrust
claim against [the assignor] under the holding in Broadcom,
they do not against [the assignee].
Vizio, Inc. v. Funai Electric Co., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30850, *14–16 (C.D.
Cal. Feb. 3, 2010).
132
Lemley, supra note 28, at 1932.
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deliberations in such a manner as to show that its selection of a proprietary
standard was predicated on the patent holder’s RAND covenant. Armed
with this evidentiary record, Qualcomm would permit standard-users the
ability to bring an antitrust proceeding based solely on a disagreement over
RAND royalties. In turn, this would exacerbate the prospect of buyer-side
hold-up in licensing negotiations, whereby standard-users could credibly
threaten to bring such litigation in order to depress the royalty rate.
Nimmer noted that the threat of litigation post-Qualcomm may
deter patent-holders from participating in standard-setting activities
altogether.133 Combined with Rambus, the nondisclosure is the safer
strategy; both to escape liability for an actual ambush, but also to avoid ex
post exploitation of RAND commitments by standard-users. This in turn
can be expected to further impede the efficiency of standard-setting
endeavors, as participants in the process will be more distrustful of each
other, and users will be more doubtful about the standards adopted and the
hidden patent rights that may lie therein.
¶51

C. Doctrinal Deficiencies of Antitrust
Patent ambushes can harm technology markets and consumers.
Although antitrust serves to prevent consumer harm, it is not designed to
address the unique context of a patent ambush. Whereas liability for
monopolization requires exclusionary conduct that created or maintained
the defendant’s monopoly, the standardized market structure is most
directly attributable to the SSO’s activities. If deception enables one firm to
win inclusion of its technology in the standard over the proprietary
technology of another firm, this is merely a distributional difference among
private actors rather than a structural change of the market economics. If
deception enables the avoidance of RAND licensing limits, this is a pricing
problem but not a competitive effect.
¶52

Even in the limited case in which deception truly steered an SSO
away from a nonproprietary standard and caused it to select the ex post
monopolist’s technology, antitrust liability is an ill-suited remedy. When an
ambush involves a patent holder’s breach of its RAND commitment,
unenforceability may be an inappropriate remedy. The SSO would only
have selected the technology if its quality-adjusted value, at the expected
RAND rates, exceeded the value conferred by the royalty-free
nonproprietary standard. Therefore, if the patent is rendered unenforceable,
the standard-users may reap a windfall. Even without an unenforceability
ruling, treble damages may still be overcompensatory, and the possibility of
¶53

133

NIMMER, supra note 4, § 4:62 (“[Qualcomm] creates numerous potential
traps for rights owners who participate in SSO’s, perhaps creating incentives for
them not to do so.”).
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either remedy would be likely to encourage actual and threatened
litigation.134
Finally, in the case where the deception was nondisclosure and but
for this the SSO would have adopted a nonproprietary technology,
unenforceability may still be an excessive punishment against the standardowner. Standards compete with non-standardized technological alternatives
as well as other standards, and monopolization of a particular technology
market is not at all certain.135 Although ex ante the SSO would have chosen
an open standard, standard users may value the proprietary technology
component and be willing to pay to license it. Or, if the nonproprietary
technology had originally been adopted by the SSO, the standard might not
have attracted comparable user demand. The standard-owner should be
entitled to recover the differential value conferred by its technology over
available alternatives.
¶54

Overall, the application of antitrust doctrine to patent ambush
frustrates standard-setting efforts. Beneficial technologies may be withheld
or excluded from an SSO, and resulting standards may be technologically
suboptimal and may fail to gain widespread adoption or longevity.
Furthermore, freedom of contract of SSO participants is impeded by
antitrust rules that create new obligations where none previously existed, as
in N-Data, or establish incentives to challenge a standard-owner’s right to
receive royalties, as in Qualcomm. The net effect is exacerbated
inefficiency, both in the ex ante standard-setting activities and in ex post
licensing negotiations.
¶55

V. CONCLUSION
Antitrust law does not adequately address the patent ambush
problem and impedes rather than facilitates beneficial standard-setting.
When antitrust prohibitions do apply, as under Qualcomm, they are overly
harsh and create concomitant burdens on the marketplace. When antitrust
liability does not arise, as under Rambus, patent ambushers remain free to
extract economic rents from the market and potentially stunt its long-term
growth. To the extent that a solution to the patent ambush problem is
needed, antitrust does not hold the key. An adequate remedy would
preserve the incentives of patent holders to submit their innovative
¶56

134

See Farrell et al., supra note 33, at 659 (“Antitrust remedies generally seek to
restore competition and compensate injured parties for antitrust harm they have
suffered. The trebling of actual damages . . . serve[s] a deterrence function.”).
135
Lemley, supra note 28, at 1932 (“[T]he SSO’s decision to adopt the standard
must in turn influence the market. Not all or even most standards adopted
through an SSO dominate a relevant market.”).
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technologies for consideration by SSOs, while restricting their ability to
reap more than their share of the ex post benefits of standardization.

